

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 09672 211732Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 082964 /43
P R 211700Z DEC 76 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5875
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T ANKARA 9672

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS SITUATION

1. IN MEETING THIS MORNING (DEC 21) WITH MFA SEC GEN
ELEKDAG, AND AFTER COVERING A NUMBER OF OTHER SUBJECTS BEING
SEPARATELY REPORTED, I TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF THE CYPRUS
SITUATION. I NOTED THAT SOME WHO HAD TALKED WITH THE
FINMIN RECENTLY HAD COME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION OF
SLIGHTLY MORE OPTIMISM AND FLEXIBILITY ON HIS PART THAN
THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED EARLIER. IN RESPONSE ELEKDAG SIAD
THERE WAS NO SHIFT IN THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDES
OF EITHER PRIMIN DEMIREL OF FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL WITH
RESPECT TO THE CYPRUS SITUATION. HE SAID BOTH HAVE
FROM THE START WANTED A SETTLEMENT AND BOTH HAVE
RECOGNIZED THAT TO GET A SETTLEMENT THERE MUST BE
GIVE-AND-TAKE NEGOTIATION. SPECIFICALLY, LEKDAG

EMPHASIZED, BOTH UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TURKS COULD NOT
KEEP ALL OF THE TERRITORY PRESENTLY HELD, THAT TO DO
SO WOULD BRAND THEM IN THE WORLD AS "USURPERS." ON
THE OTHER HAND, ELEKDAG CONTINUED, FROM THE START
BOTH HAD HAD TO CONTEND WITH A COALITION POLITICAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 09672 211732Z

SITUATION WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR CAGLAYANGIL
TO OFFER SUGGESTED TERRITORIAL COMPROMISES OR TO
RESPOND TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INQUIRIES RE SPECIFIC
PERCENTAGES. "TO DO SO WOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF
THE GOVERNMENT," SAID ELEKDAG. THE DEVICE THAT

DEMIREL AND CAGLAYANGIL HAD FORMULATED TO GET AROUND THIS PROBLEM, HE CONTINUED, WAS THE SUBCOMMITTEE PROCEDURE (WITH WHICH THE DEPARTMENT IS OF COURSE VERY FAMILIAR). THE IDEA WAS TO AVOID THE GOT'S SEEMING TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION OF OFFERING A COMPROMISE ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, BUT RATHER TO GET A NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNDER WAY FROM WHICH A COMPROMISE SOLUTION COULD THEN EMERGE AND BE PLACED ON ANKARA'S LAP ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS.

2. ELEKDAG SAID THAT A SECOND AND KEY PART OF THE DEMIREL-CAGLAYANGIL PLAN WAS THEN TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT. THIS INVOLVED GETTING PRESIDENT KORUTURK TO CONVENE A " COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC." ELEKDAG NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH CONSTITUTIONAL BODY IN TURKEY BUT IN EFFECT DEMIREL AND CAGLAYANGIL INTENDED TO INVENT IT. IT WOULD BE CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD INCLUDE THE LEADERS OF ALL TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES (I.E., DEMIREL, ECEVIT, ERBAKAN, BOZBEYLI, ET AL), PLUS THE CHIEF AND MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF. THROUGH THIS CONUNCIL DEMIREL AND CAGLAYANGIL HOPED TO DEPOLITICIZE THE ISSUE, AT LEAST TO THE POINT WHERE THE SOLUTION NEGOTIATED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE COULD BE ACCEPTE.

3. ELEKDAG SAID THAT THIS TWO STAGE SCHEME HAD BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, THE BASIC DEMIREL-CAGLAYANGIL PLAN. ELEKDAG DID NOT THINK THAT EITHER THE PRIMIN OR THE FONMIN WAS IN A MORE, OR LESS, FLEXIBLE MOOD NOW THAN THEY HAD BEEN ALL ALONG. AS FOR BEING MORE OPTIMISTIC, ELEKDAG'S VIEW WAS THAT NEITHER WAS MORE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 09672 211732Z

OPTIMISTIC THAN BEFORE BECAUSE " THE GREEKS REFUSE TO PLAY, THAT IS, THEY REFUSE TO GO TO SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS". THAT, ELEKDAG AGAIN EMPHASIZED, IS THE ONLY FORUM WHICH CAN PRODUCE THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT ANKARA CAN ACCEPT.

4. COMMENT: WHILE THE ODDS REMAIN VERY LONG AGAINST ANY TURKISH GOVERNMENT ACTING RESOURCEFULLY AND SUCCESSFULLY TO EFFECT A CYPRUS SOLUTION BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S ELECTIONS, DEMIREL AND CAGLAYANGIL ARE THE TYPE OF ABLE AND CANNY POLITICAL MANEUVERERS WHO MIGHT HAVE A BETTER CHANCE THAN MOST OF PULLING THIS OFF. IF THEY COULD ND A WAY TO COME UP WITH A REASONABLE SOLUTION --AND ONE NN WHICH THEY HAD NOT BEEN TOO PUBLICLY "OUT FRONT" IN PRODUCING--THE "COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC" FORMULA JUST MIGHT WORK. THIS DOES NOT HELP, HOWEVER, WITH THE MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF DEVISING A COMPROMISE

SOLUTION TO TAKE TO THE COUNCIL, WITHOUT
DEMIREL'S HAKY COALITION COMING APART IN THE PROCESS.
DEMIREL AND CAGLAYANGIL BELIEVE
THE SUB-COMMITTEE
PROCEDURE IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE AVENUE. IN EMBASSY'S

VIEW WHAT NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED NOW IS WHETHER THIS
ROUTE IS DEAD AND, IF SO, WHETHER AN ACCEPTABLE
ALTERNATIVE CAN BE FOUND.
MACOMBER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976ANKARA09672
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760468-0796
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761222/aaaaassu.tel
Line Count: 125
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: BoyleJA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 APR 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by BoyleJA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS SITUATION
TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006